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OUT OF THE FRYING PAN AND INTO THE FIRE: THE
EMERGENCE OF DEPUBLICATION IN THE WAKE OF
VACATUR
Eugene R. Anderson, Mark Garbowski,
and Daniel J. Healy*

I.

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A little more than ten years ago, members of our firm,
which specializes in representing policyholders against
insurance companies, discovered that a significant number of the
pro-policyholder judicial decisions were being wiped off the law
books by the insurance industry. During the early 1990s, the
manipulation of the judicial system, probably our most precious
heritage, garnered much attention.'
It became clear that insurance companies are different types
of litigants than policyholders. The overwhelming majority of
insurance policyholders are one-time insurance coverage
litigants; to a policyholder, a favorable settlement is far more
significant than a resounding pro-policyholder opinion.
Insurance companies, on the other hand, are repeat litigants that
face the same exact issues over and over again in courts across
the country. Insurance companies, therefore, have a higher
interest in the body of caselaw that is developing. Through
vacatur, insurance companies can eradicate or reduce the
number of pro-policyholder decisions and then argue that the

* Eugene R. Anderson and Mark Garbowski are shareholders in the New York office of
Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C. Daniel J. Healy is an attorney in the Washington, D.C., office
of the same firm.
1. See Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Proprietyof EradicatingPriorDecisional
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 589 (1991); Stacy Gordon,
Vanishing Precedents, Bus. Ins. 1 (June 15, 1992); Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common

Law, 14 Am. Law. 74 (Mar. 1992).
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weight of authority is in their favor.2 This is also true of other
repeat litigants, such as governmental entities and intellectual
property holders.
As an example, a classic "sale" of pro-policyholder
caselaw occurred in 1981 when Hartford Accident and
Indemnity paid $200,000 to expunge from the case books a
decision of United States District Court Judge Morris Lasker of
the Southern District of New York. 3

In Bankers Trust, Judge Lasker held that Bankers Trust
Company was entitled to coverage from Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company for certain cleanup costs incurred by
Bankers Trust in removing oil from its property.4 Nearly four
months later, Judge Lasker signed an order vacating his earlier
decision in favor of Bankers Trust. Judge Lasker indicated that
he took this action so as to allow Hartford to submit additional
materials to the court, after which Judge Lasker would
"determine Bankers' motion for summary judgment de novo."'
Apparently, Hartford would pay Bankers Trust $2.3 millionabout $200,000 more than the amount the court had awarded
Bankers Trust in its original decision-with 6the provision that
Judge Lasker would vacate his earlier opinion.
There have even been cases in which the insurance
company agreed to settle and pay the policyholder after the
insurance company obtained a favorable decision because the
insurance company feared that the decisions would be reversed
on reconsideration:
[W]hen [the policyholder's] counsel became aware of two
superior court cases that had addressed the same issue
before the court, they moved for reconsideration of the

2. See Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent: Eduardo Meets Vacatur, 70 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 325, 356 (1994); Michael W. Loudenslager, Student Author, Erasing the
Law: The hnplications of Settlements Conditioned upon Vacatur or Reversal of Judgments,

50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1229, 1230 (1993).
3. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371
(S.D.N.Y.) , vacated, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Intel Corp. v. HartfordAccident
& Indemn. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1192 n. 32 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,
952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Parloff, supra n. 1, at 74.
4. See Bankers Trust, 518 F. Supp. at 373.
5. See Bankers Trust, 621 F. Supp. at 685.

6. Intel Corp., 692 F. Supp. at 1192 n. 32 (citing an affidavit from Bankers Trust
Company's counsel); see also Parloff, supra n. 2, at 74.
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damages ruling on the basis of these decisions. Judge Bryan
then wrote counsel for additional briefing on whether these
superior court decisions were binding or if they required
certification to the State Supreme Court. Soon thereafter,
the insurers settled with Ross Electric. Thus the Ross
opinion was decided without the benefit of the reasoning of
the only Washington court to have addressed the issue.

By paying the policyholder even after obtaining a ruling
that would have negated or limited coverage, the insurance
company was able to keep a pro-insurance company decision on
the books and avoid reconsideration.
The benefit to the repeat litigant of the skillful use of
vacatur is clear: If successful in gaining vacatur, the litigant can,
in part, control the content of the relevant caselaw without doing
more than ask that the courts rely upon what remains in the case
reporters.8 The insurance industry supports its coverage
positions in legal briefs and memoranda by representing to
courts what "the vast majority of cases hold." For example, in a
brief filed by American Casualty Company of Reading, PA
("ACCO"), ACCO stated that a "majority" of courts have
interpreted the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion as
having a temporal meaning:
By this Supplemental Opposition, ACCO does not concede
that the Broadwell decision correctly interprets the "sudden
and accidental"
phrase. Instead, ACCO opposes
application of the Broadwell interpretation, relying instead
on the majority'view in [sic] throughout the country that
7. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 515 (Wash. 1990).
8. It is not possible to conduct after-the-fact research to ascertain whether courts have
vacated valuable decisions; when a decision is vacated prior to the publication of a written
opinion, there is often nothing left to inform the public what was decided. The only traces
of such a decision may be a cryptic statement like the following entry in West's Federal
Reporter for New England Reinsurance Corp. v. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa., 829 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1987):
ORDER
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties,
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) The court grants the petition of appellee for rehearing;
(2) the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment of National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh is hereby vacated; and
(3) this court's opinion filed July 21, 1987, reversing the district court's order
and remanding for proceedings consistent with the opinion is hereby vacated and
withdrawn from publication.
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"sudden and accidental" has a temporal element, and
means "immediate and unexpected." 9
In response to this growing trend, when our firm first began
publishing a website in April 26, 1996, we created the Vacatur
Center, "to help preserve court decisions that have been wiped
off the books by losing litigants." ,0 From the beginning, the
most important part of the Vacatur Center was the text of
vacated and depublished decisions. In many instances, the only
publicly available text of these vacated cases was in the Vacatur
Center maintained by our firm. Recently, the continuing efforts
of other parties, including Westlaw and LEXIS, and the
willingness of many courts to publish many of their vacated
decisions on the World Wide Web, has shifted the role of the
Vacatur Center from less of an archive to more of a general
information clearinghouse.
The remainder of this article discusses the development of
the modern rules governing vacatur and the impact these
generally more restrictive rules have had on a party's ability to
use the tool of vacatur to control precedent. The article then
discusses depublication, which presents the same dangers as
vacatur and has increased significantly while the use of vacatur
has decreased. The article concludes with a discussion of the
trend, growing through private efforts and the willingness of
courts to publish on the World Wide Web, to make vacated and
depublished decisions generally available."

II.

THE COURTS' EFFORTS TO RESTRICT VACATUR

Since 1996, when the Supreme Court announced in U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership2 a narrow
approach to vacatur after a settlement between the parties moots
9. Supp. Opposition of Def. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial S.J.
with Respect to the Price Landfill Claims at 8 n. 5, Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Pa. Mfrs.
Assn. Ins. Co., No. L-78660-87 (N.J. Super., App. Div. May 16, 1993).
10. Anderson Kill & Olick, Vacatur Center <http://www/andersonkill.comlVacaturCenter/Vacatur _Center.asp> (last updated Nov. 26, 2002).
11. Although some authors use the terms interchangeably, in this article the word
"vacatur" will refer to decisions that are vacated at the request of the parties, and
"depublication" will refer to decisions that are not officially published as more than an
administrative decision by the court.
12. 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994).
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the case on appeal, the formerly widespread use of motions to
vacate in the federal circuits has been discouraged.
A. Bonner Mall and Its FederalProgeny
The leading United States Supreme Court decision on
vacatur holds that "mootness by reason of settlement does not
justify vacatur of a judgment under review." 3 Vacatur may be
granted only after a showing of "exceptional circumstances"
that establish "equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy
of vacatur." 14
Essential policy considerations supporting our legal system
underlie the decision. "Some litigants, at least, may think it
worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in the district court,
or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable outcome
can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur." "5The
court recognized, however, that
"[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and
valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not
merely the property of private litigants and should stand
unless a court concludes that the public interest would be
served by a vacatur." ... To allow a party... to employ

the secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of
collateral attack on the judgment would-quite apart from
any considerations of fairness to the parties-disturb the
orderly operation of the federal judicial system."
The reasoning of Bonner Mall was not novel, 7 but it
established a consistent approach for federal courts. Indeed,
13. Id. (stating that "exceptional circumstances do not include the mere fact that the

settlement agreement provides for vacatur" ).
14. Id. at 26 (stating further that "[i]t is petitioner's burden as the party seeking relief
from the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not merely equivalent
responsibility for the mootness, but equitable entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of

vacatur" ).
15. Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted).
16. Id. at 26 (quoting lzumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993)).
17. See Meml. Hosp. of Iowa City v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d
1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the Seventh Circuit routinely denies requests to
vacate opinions because "an opinion is a public act of the government, which may not be
expunged by private agreement"); Benavides v. Jackson Natl. Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp.
1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting that post-settlement vacatur "provides no incentive for
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although Bonner Mall dealt solely with appellate vacatur,
federal district courts have echoed the Supreme Court's policy
concerns that in heavily litigated areas (e.g., employment
discrimination) the development of decisional law provides
guidance to both private parties and appellate courts." The
Fourth Circuit, holding that vacatur in the district court was
equally limited, expressly relied upon the equitable
considerations in Bonner Mall, and noted that it "could discern
no reason why.., the general presumption against vacatur,
which arises by virtue of the extraordinary nature of that relief,
should be different for the district court than for the appellate
court," 19 The Fourth Circuit found that "[o]nly the Ninth
Circuit-and it only arguably-has rejected the view that the
standards set forth in [Bonner Mall] should also be relevant to a
district court's vacatur decision under Rule 60(b)(6)." 20

early settlement" and "encourages litigants to roll the dice," and finding the view that
vacatur encourages settlement "empirically unsupported" and contrary to the court's
experience); see also Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir.
1991) (quoting Meml. Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302).
18. See Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95 CIV. 10439 (DLC), 1999 WL
13036, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1999) (stating further that vacatur will discourage parties
from settling prior to the rendering of a judgment). A federal circuit court is empowered to
vacate a decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1026, while a federal district court may vacate a
decision under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
19. Valero TerrestrialCorp. v. Paige,211 F.3d 112, 118 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Bonner
Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-27).
20. Id. at 121 (citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods.,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1998) (reaffirming a broad equitable balancing test that
allows a district court to "decide whether to vacate its judgment in light of 'the
consequences and attendant hardships of dismissal or refusal to dismiss' and 'the
competing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes"'
(citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1995))); see also Aqua Marine
Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding no "exceptional
circumstances" where losing party settles); The Medical Prof Mut. Ins. Co. v. Breon Lab.,
Inc., 141 F.3d 372, 376 (1st Cir. 1998) (refusing to vacate a settled case where contribution
issues were determined); Pressley Ridge Sch. v. Shimer, 134 F.3d 1218, 1222 (4th Cir.
1998) (denying a motion to vacate where the mootness resulted from the losing party's
decision to settle); Amoco Oil Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 231 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that entering into a consent decree that mooted the appeal did not constitute
"exceptional circumstances" and was analogous to settlement); Krolikowski v. Volanti, No.
95 C 1254, 1996 WL 451307 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 7, 1996) (finding no "exceptional
circumstances" where parties settled and judgment involved punitive damages).
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B. State Court Decisions after Bonner Mall
New York, almost immediately after Bonner Mall was
decided, adopted the reasoning of that decision, and its courts
generally refuse to vacate decisions made moot by settlement,
absent some overriding consideration mitigating in favor of

vacatur.2 ' Oregon also recognized the reasoning of Bonner Mall
shortly after it was rendered. However, more recent decisions
from that state leave the state of the law somewhat unclear.23
Similarly, Connecticut has recognized the presumptive validity
of judgments and used the burden created by Bonner Mall as a
standard.24 Even though the standard has not been consistently
applied in Connecticut to refuse to vacate after a settlement,25 the
ideal that a party should not be permitted to wipe a case out of
26
the law by settling is supported.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also has
adopted the reasoning of Bonner Mall, stating that "if the parties
have settled the case [on appeal] the proper course of action is to
dismiss the appeal as moot." 27 Similarly, Illinois appellate courts

21. See Paramount Communications v. Gibraltar Cas. Co., 623 N.Y.S.2d 850, 850
(App. Div., 1st Dept. 1995) (stating "we do not. believe it would be advisable to allow
private parties to demand that the Court eradicate precedent which they personally find
unacceptable" and citing Bonner Mall).
22. See Lowe v. Keisling, 889 P.2d 916, 918 (Or. 1995) (Unis, J., dissenting) (citing
Bonner Mall reasoning to support his position that vacatur, rather than the dismissal
ordered by the majority, was appropriate when a petition for review is moot because
disputed election already took place).
23. See First Commerce of Am., Inc. v. Nimbus Ctr. Assocs., 986 P.2d 556, 561 (Or.
1999) (stating that the general practice should be to vacate mooted decisions and vacating
decision involving third-party claims that were mooted when the first-party claims were
dismissed) (citing dissent in Lowe v. Keisling, 889 P.2d at 918).
24. See Commr. of Motor Vehicles v. DeMilo & Co., Inc., 659 A.2d 148, 159 (Conn.
1995) (citing policy in Bonner Mall when recognizing the viability of a lower court
judgment, even when its appeal was rendered moot).
25. See Taft v. Wheelabrator Putnam, Inc., 763 A.2d 1044 (Conn. 2000) (granting
motion to vacate after settlement on appeal).
26. See id. at 1044 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (stating that where the parties settled
on appeal, the circumstances "present[ed] a classic example of when vacatur is not
appropriate" and citing Bonner Mall).
27. Milar Elevator Co. v. D.C. Dept. of Empl. Servs., 704 A.2d 291, 293 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (stating that some states apply the exception to this rule when an issue of public
importance is before the court). Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
is a federal court, its decision is discussed in this section of the article because this case
involved a local government authority.
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have refused to grant vacatur where parties have not pursued
there statutory remedies to decisions or even challenged the
correctness of the decision sought to be vacated.28 Missouri
courts have used permissive language to describe a court's
ability to vacate, but they have restricted that ability in situations
where a party seeks vacatur after seeking settlement. 9 Other
states have adopted positions similar to that taken in Bonner
Mall.3°
The decisions of the California and Texas state courts
represent the minority view, favoring vacatur of cases upon the
parties' request following settlement.3 '
1. California
The California Supreme Court ruled in Neary v. Regents of
the University of California, that vacatur should be granted
when sought by stipulated motion "absent a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that warrant an exception to this
general rule." 3 Neary flips the burden of proof upon the party
not seeking vacatur, who presumably stipulated to the motion, or

28. Chicago City Day Sch. v. City of Chicago, 681 N.E.2d 126, 129 (II. App., Ist Dist.,
2d Div. 1997). This case presents circumstances similar to those in 19 Solid Waste Dept.
Mech. v. City of Albuquerque, 76 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 1996), in which the Tenth Circuit
also denied vacatur where a municipality changed a local law to moot a prior dispute and
then sought to vacate that prior decision.
29. State v. City of Kansas City, 968 S.W.2d 232, 243 (Mo. App., W. Dist. 1998)
(holding "that the normal practice should be to vacate the judgment when one or more
parties requests such action in a case moot on appeal. Except where equity demands
otherwise, a motion for vacation made by a party who had no control over the mooting
event should be granted, at least as to that party.").
30. See e.g. Dowell v. Dennis, 998 P.2d 206, 213 (Okla. App., 3d Div. 1999) (citing to
Bonner Mall and adopting the "exceptional circumstances" standard).
31. Wisconsin also appears to have come down on the minority side of the question.
See Mason Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Firstar Bank Eau Claire, NA, 596 N.W.2d 373, 374 (Wis.
1999). However, the dissent in Mason Shoe relies on Bonner Mall. Id. (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
32. 834 P.2d 119, 121, 122-23 (Cal. 1992) (stating that "[slimple fairness requires that
the first and most weighty consideration be given to the parties' interests and that they be
accommodated except in the extraordinary case"); see also Charles House, Appellate
Counsellor Memos, Stipulated Reversals and Vacatur <http://www.appellatecounsellor.com/memos/vacatur.htm> (July 21, 1998) (explaining the California approach
to vacatur and distinguishing it from the federal approach).
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upon the court to sua sponte determine that there is a
countervailing public policy interest mitigating against vacatur.3 3
However, even the California Supreme Court has had to
limit the extent of the presumption created by Neary. In later
decisions, that court has distinguished between a stipulated
motion to vacate a trial judgment and a dismissal of an appellate
decision.34 The distinction is two pronged:
First, in Neary, we stressed the efficiency of effectuating
settlements and thereby avoiding further litigation. As the
case proceeds further into the appellate process, however,
especially after an appellate decision is actually rendered,
more is eradicated by a settlement, and less is gained by the
avoidance of further litigation. Second, stipulating that the
Court of Appeal opinion not be published and that we not
render our own decision would effectively eliminate a
precedent-setting appellate decision. As Neary itself
stressed, "[T]rial courts make no binding precedents."
Published appellate decisions do.
The California Supreme Court has had to limit its broad
rule to prevent its own decision from, presumably, being
flaunted by well-fiunded parties who, in the face of an adverse
decision, can simply disregard the ruling and the applicable rule
of law b y settling contingent upon vacation of the adverse
Despite its statement that the most weighty
decision.
consideration be given to the parties' interests, the California
Supreme Court is not willing to permit its own appellate
33. See Morrow v. Hood Commun., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4h 924, 926 (Cal. App., Dist. 1,
Div. 2 1997) (granting a stipulated reversal where the submission to the court did not
evidence "extraordinary circumstances" under Neary). However, the majority stated that
although it was bound to follow Neary, stare decisis did not prevent it "from respectfully
stating [its] agreement with the fundamental principles set forth by Presiding Justice Kline
in his dissent" Id. at 926. Justice Kline's dissent argues that Neary represents a minority
view that was repudiated by the Supreme Court in Bonner Mall and undermines the
integrity of the judicial process by effectuating the will of private parties in place of the
rule of law. See id. at 927-28.
34. State Lands Commn. v. Super. Ct., 900 P.2d 648, 654 (Cal. 1995).
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. In so doing, the California courts note publication as an important difference
between a trial court judgment and an appellate decision, recognizing that a precedentsetting decision should not be permitted to be depublished by the parties. However, as
discussed below, California courts publish less than ten percent of their appellate decisions.
See also Committee for the Rule of Law, Court Statistics Report <http://www.
nonpublication.com/statistics.html> (last updated December 1, 2002).
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decisions to be disregarded, no matter the interests of the parties.
However, parties are still free to buy their way out of an adverse
judgment from a lower court.
2. Texas
Texas courts have approached the issue of vacatur
similarly, making a point of not following the reasoning of
Bonner Mall because that decision "is not binding precedent
because the issue decided was one of federal procedural law"
not state procedural law.37 The court in Panterra then vacated
the lower court judgment and dismissed the appeal, under the
"long standing" Texas law that when an appeal is mooted, for
whatever reason, "all previous orders are set aside by the
appellate court and the cause is dismissed." 38
The Panterraapproach continues to be the Texas approach
today.39 Despite Texas's slightly more progressive approach to
depublication, 40 it still maintains a system in which state court
decisions may be vacated simply by stipulated motion. Thus,
litigants remain free to purchase freedom from an adverse ruling
by paying the opposing party in order to file a stipulated motion
to dismiss. It appears that, even distinguishing itself from
California, Texas will vacate a decision at any level, appellate or
otherwise.41
C. Two Areas Where the Use of Vacatur Has Continued
Although Bonner Mall has served to reduce the amount of
vacated decisions, courts justify the use of vacatur in cases
involving intellectual property claims and cases involving a
government agency as a litigant.
37. Panterra Corp. v. Am.Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300, 300-301 (Tex App. 1995)
(granting vacatur and citing multiple Texas Supreme Court decisions as authority).
38. Id.
39. See Weatherford Intl. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. 01-00-00191-CV, 2001 WL
665584, *1 (June 14, 2001) (stating that a party's reliance on Bonner Mall was misplaced
as that decision is contrary to Texas procedural law).
40. See infra n. 96 and accompanying text.
41. Panterra,908 S.W.2d at 300 (stating that Texas' broad rule is that "when a case
becomes moot while on appeal, all previous orders are set aside by the appellate court and
the cause is dismissed) (emphasis original) (citation omitted).
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1. Protectionof Intellectual Property
Cases brought to protect one party's intellectual property
often involve unique circumstances that courts have held are
"extraordinary" under the Bonner Mall standard. Specifically,
these situations have been held to be extraordinary, and
therefore appropriate for vacatur, when the defending party
faces a financially devastating judgment, when the challenging
party cannot settle without risking collateral attacks that would
deprive it of its trademark, and when the public interest in the
publication of the district court opinion is minimal.
For example, in Major League Baseball Properties,Inc. v.
Pacific Trading Cards, Inc., the Second Circuit granted a
stipulated motion to vacate a decision that had denied a motion
to enjoin defendant Pacific's use of plaintiff MLB's
trademarks. 41 Pacific had prevailed in opposing MLB's motion
for a preliminary injunction, but the circuit court indicated, after
a hearing on an expedited appeal, that the court would grant the3
injunction and gave the parties time to agree to a bond amount.
During that time, the parties settled the lawsuit because an
injunction would have been financially ruinous for the
defendant. However, the plaintiff could not settle unless the
lower court decision was vacated. Plaintiff had to continue to
test the merits of the lower court's decision or risk losing its
trademarks." The court found exceptional circumstances as "the
victor in the district court wanted a settlement as much as, or
more than, the loser did.... The only damage to the public
interest from such a vacatur would be that the validity of
[plaintiff's] marks would be left to future litigation."4 5
Applying similar reasoning, the District of Utah granted a
joint motion to vacate a judgment for $26 million against a
defendant for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
false advertising.46 Plaintiff Novell, a computer software
42. 150 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 150.
44. Id. at 152. Plaintiff had a duty to defend its marks against all infringers or be
subject to the defense of acquiescence. Id. Therefore, plaintiff could not leave the district
court decision intact and had to either pursue an injunction in the circuit court or obtain a
vacatur as part of the settlement.
45. Id.
46. Novell, Inc. v. Network Trading Ctr., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999).
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producer, had sued defendant Network Trading Center, Inc.
(NTC) for illegal resale of its computer software. The huge
judgment against NTC was destroying its business and the
parties eventually reached a settlement while their appeal to the
Tenth Circuit was pending. 4' The settlement was contingent on
the vacatur of the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment denying plaintiff's copyright claims.48
Citing Bonner Mall and MLB Properties,the Tenth Circuit
granted the motion to vacate. The "crushing amount" of the
judgment, NTC's counsel's unequivocal representations of the
desperate final position of the defendants and Novell's status as
a "repeat player" with other pending and potential cases against
alleged infringers gave it a "substantial interest in partially
vacating this court's judgment and settling the case., 49 These
facts constituted "exceptional circumstances" under Bonner
Mall.
However, in a patent case, the Federal Circuit refused to
find "exceptional circumstances" where plaintiff Aqua Marine
had other means of protecting its patent. Aqua Marine settled
after bringing a patent infringement case and losing on summary
judgment to defendant AIM Machining, Inc., on technical
grounds. ° The settlement agreement required the parties to
submit a joint proposed order vacating the district court
judgment holding the subject patent invalid.' The district court
denied the motion to vacate and declared the patent issue not to
be moot.52
The Federal Circuit denied the motion to vacate as well
because "the defendants' lack of continuing interest in the
validity of the 1919 patent is the result of Aqua Marine's own

47. Id. at 659.
48. Id. Notably, the parties agreed to leave intact the remainder of the lower court's
decision and judgment.
49. Id. at 661. A very similar decision was reached in Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods.,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (vacating where issues became moot due to a
merger and noting that "[w]ithout the vacatur [the copyright holder] would lose the right to

have the adverse copyright decision reviewed by an appellate court").
50. Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The
district court applied the "on sale" rule to find the plaintiff's patent invalid because it had
been on sale for over one year prior to the filing of the patent application.
51. Id. at 1218-19.
52. Id. at 1219.
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action entering into the [settlement] Agreement." 53 Therefore,

the court found no "exceptional circumstances," despite Aqua
Marine's concern that the judgment of invalidity could be used
by another infringer to defend against an infringement suit. The
court noted that "Aqua Marine could avoid collateral estoppel
by arguing that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue of invalidity." 14
2. Government Agency as a Litigant
In cases involving a government agent as a litigant, either
as an arbiter of the dispute prior to an appeal to a district court or
as a government agency that is a true litigant prior to an appeal
of a judgment against that agency, the courts have recognized
legitimate concerns of the government agency as a repeat
litigant, but have balanced those concerns against the needs of
the private litigants.
In Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. FCC, the
District Court for the District of Columbia granted a motion to
vacate an FCC finding that plaintiff AFLAC, then a licensee of
six television stations, had violated a regulation by refusing to
sell time to presidential candidates (the Dole-Kemp Campaign)
unless they agreed to a forum-selection clause.5" AFLAC sought
to vacate the FCC finding on the grounds that it had sold its
interests in the television stations after the FCC ruling but before
the district court's decision.
AFLAC wanted the FCC decisions vacated because the
state statute of limitations on some of the offending contracts
had not run and it feared it could be sued.56 The FCC had a
continuing interest in regulating offending forum selection
clauses, and thus wanted the finding to remain in place.57 The
court vacated, despite the FCC's continuing interest as a "repeat
player," but a key factor was that AFLAC did not settle with the
FCC. AFLAC had announced the sale of its television station

53. Id. at 1221.
54. Id.

55. 129 F.3d 625 (D.D.C. 1997).
56. Id. at 627-28.
57. Id.
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interests before Dole-Kemp even complained and AFLAC had
not sold the interests to moot the case.58
In 19 Solid Waste Department Mechanics v. City of
Albuquerque, the Tenth Circuit refused to vacate a decision
where nineteen city employees challenged the drug testing
policy of the City of Albuquerque and prevailed before the
district court.5 9 At oral argument before the circuit court, the city
revealed that it had withdrawn the policy at issue and
subsequently moved for a declaration of mootness.6° The circuit
court found the case to have become moot, but denied the city's
motion to vacate because "the City unquestionably caused the
mootness by withdrawing the policy." 6' The court further found
that the city's argument that the decision should be vacated
because it was wrong "collide[d] head on with the Supreme
Court's admonition that a party should not be
allowed to use
62
vacatur as a refined form of collateral attack."
In contrast, the First Circuit in Motta v. INS recognized the
INS as a "repeat player" with legitimate interests, after the
parties had settled, in a vacatur of the district court decision
granting plaintiff Motta a writ of habeas corpus. 63 The court saw
no prohibition of vacatur by Bonner Mall because "[t]he INS
did not by its own initiative relinquish its right to vacatur ....
Rather, the INS has at all times sought to pursue its appeal; it
has agreed to consider settlement only at the suggestion of this
Court." 6 The court granted the vacatur, noting " [h]ere, the INS,
58. Id. at 630-31. In Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Commn, 198 F.3d
266 (D.D.C. 1999), the same court reviewing another agency decision refused to consider
whether vacatur was appropriate to vacate two opinions of the Federal Energy Regulation
Committee (FERC), where those opinions were rendered moot by settlement between the

energy provider, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., and its customers. The court held that
the FERC opinions were only "policy statements," not final rulings, and had no "binding

norm" for the parties. Id. at 269 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (Section 19(b) of the NGA)
which requires a party seeking judicial review to be an aggrieved party). The FERC had
"confused matters somewhat... by noting the 'ongoing precedental value' of the
challenged opinions," but the court placed more weight on the "FERC's failure to issue
final judgments on the merits" and on the fact that "Panhandle's rates for the relevant time
periods were set by the settlement agreement," not the FERC opinions. Id. at 269-70.
59. 76 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 1996).
60. Id. at 1144.
61. Id.

62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. 61 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 1995).
64. Id.at 118.
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as a repeat player before the courts, is primarily concerned with

the precedential effect of the decision below. If that decision
stands, all possibility of a settlement is eliminated." 65
III.

THE INCREASING USE OF DEPUBLICATION WITH THE
DECREASING USE OF VACATUR

In the years since Bonner Mall, our firm has become aware
of fewer cases per year that have become vacated based on
mootness by settlement.66 However, this decline in the use of
vacatur has coincided with the increase in the use of
depublication by courts. It is estimated that eighty percent of the
cases decided by federal appellate courts take the form of
"unpublished" decisions.67
A. Eighth CircuitApproach: Anastasoff
In a ruling by Judge Richard Arnold, the Eighth Circuit
declared that its rule authorizing the depublication of case
decisions, which designates a decision as having no precedental
value, violates Article III of the United States Constitution by
impermissibly allowing courts to determine which decisions will
have a precedential effect. 68 "Federal courts, in adopting rules,
are not free to extend the judicial power of the United States
described in Article III of the constitution....

The judicial

power of the
United States is limited by the doctrine of
69
precedent."
In arguing the unconstitutionality of depublication, Judge
Arnold cited Marbury v. Madison70 for the principle that
65. Id. (emphasis original).
66. Indeed, Anderson Kill has noticed a steady decline in the number of submissions
for its own Vacatur Center maintained at its web site.
67. See H.R. Jud. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,
Statement of Arthur D. Hellman (June 27, 2002) (presenting persuasive argument in favor
of rules permitting litigants to cite to unpublished decisions, even if courts are permitted to
designate such decisions as non-binding).
68. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d

1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
69. Id. at 905 (reaching its decision after a discussion of the intent of the framers with
regard to the binding nature of case decisions on future litigants).
70. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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"[i]nherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law...
authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must
be applied in subsequent cases." 7 ' He further traced the origins
of that principle back through English common law. This history
teaches that " [b]ecause precedents are the 'best and most
authoritative' guide of what the law is, the judicial power is
limited by them." 72
In the United States, judicial precedents assist in
maintaining a separation of powers in that they require courts to
pronounce the law as it is, "rather than 'will' about what it
should be," and they remove subjects from "arbitrary judges,
whose decisions would then be regulated only by their own
opinions." 73 The opinion is careful to note that it is not about
specifically whether an opinion should be "unpublished," but
whether a7 court
may deem a decision not to constitute binding
4
precedent.
Judge Arnold's decision in Anastasoff has sparked debate
among commentators and, in part, prompted a legislative look
into the practice of depublication.75 One commentator expresses
a view that, in terms of legal theory, the very danger Anastasoff
warns against-judicial decisions without a rule of law-is in
fact the norm in our judicial system. 76 Mr. Schmier describes
specifically the authority in the Ninth Circuit that he argues
grants courts in that circuit freedom "to make decisions that do
71. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899-900.
72. Id. at 901 (citing 3 Sir William W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England25).
73. Id. at 901-02 (citing, inter alia, I Sir William W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England, *258-59 and The FederalistNo. 78, at 507-08).
74. Id. at 904 (stating that "So far as we are aware, every opinion and every order of

any court in this country, at least of any appellate court, is available to the public. You may
have to walk into a clerk's office and pay a per-page fee, but you can get the opinion if you
want it. Indeed most appellate courts now make their opinions, whether labeled 'published'
or not, available to anyone on line").
75. See H.R. Jud. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,
Statement of Arthur D. Hellman (June 27, 2002).
76. See H.R. Jud. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,
Statement of Kenneth J. Schmier, Chairman, Comm. for the Rule of Law (June 27, 2002)
(stating that the law of precedents, "a fundamental element of the rule of law, has been
rendered ineffective ... because the vast majority of our court determinations are now
made in unpublished, unciteable, nonprecedental decisions, but [it] would be equally true if
only a fraction of one percent of decisions were allowed to be so made").
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not create precedent,"

requiring them "to ignore all cases

marked unpublished no matter how relevant," and
77 giving them
freedom "to make law of ephemeral application."
B. Ninth CircuitApproach: Hart
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion
meant to address the arguments raised in the Anastasoff
decision.7 ' The opinion states that applying Eighteenth Century
theories to modem issues creates the danger of freezing certain
aspects of the law, despite that other aspects continue to
change.9 It also points out that "[t]he overwhelming consensus
in the legal community," including every federal circuit and all
but four states (Connecticut, Delaware, New York and North

Dakota),

have

rules limiting

the

precedental

effect of

unpublished decisions. 0
Judge Kozinski argues that the English common law judges
and jurisprudence were much more flexible than described by

Anastasoff, and that case decisions were not pronouncements of
law, but the result of research of past decisions and that even
those reported decisions were often not verbatim and were
prepared by independent reporters. s' Thus, the opinion states that
77. Id.
78. Hart v. Massanari,266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001)
79. Id. at 1162-1163 (faulting reasoning in Anastasoff for relying on Eighteenth
Century historical context and arguments).
80. Id. at 1163 n. 7 (using this majority stance to argue that Anastasoff attempts to color
past practices as more adherent to precedent when in fact the "concept of precedent today
is far stricter"). However, only the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits
actually ban citation to unpublished opinions. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart
to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. of App.
Prac. & Proc. 1, 4 (2002) (citing the rules of each circuit). The other eight circuits
"discourage citation of unpublished opinions, typically calling it 'disfavored,' but
grudgingly allow it." Id. Only the Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits permit citation to
unpublished decisions for precedental value, while the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits permit citation to unpublished decisions only as persuasive authority. Id. at 5.
These numbers generally are confirmed by testimony given before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property. See H.R.
Jud. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, Statement of the
Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (June 27, 2002). However, his testimony omitted discussion
of the Second and Federal Circuits and labeled the Fourth Circuit as only permitting
limited citation of unpublished cases and the Fifth Circuit as giving persuasive value to
such decisions.
81. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1166-67 (citing the practices of Lord Coke and Lord Mansfield).
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modem adherence to each opinion as a complete rule of law
precedent only developed once there was a rigid hierarchy of
courts, with courts binding those below them,82 and makes
"[d]esignating an opinion as binding circuit authority [] a
weighty decision that cannot be taken lightly."83
Judge Kozinski concludes by stating that "the principle of
strict binding authority is itself not constitutional, but rather a
matter of judicial policy." 4 Anastasoff limits this power and
precludes circuit courts "from developing a coherent and
internally consistent body of caselaw to serve as binding
authority." 85 No precedental effect should be granted to an
unpublished decision which "is, more or less, a letter from the
court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and
the essential rationale of the court's decision." 86
C. Reactions to Anastasoff and Hart
The decisions in Anastasoff and Hart set the stage for a
split among judges and scholars. Commentators point to the
dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas as
support for Judge Arnold's position in Anastasoff." Similarly,

82. Id. at 1175.
83. Id. at 1172. Interestingly, in attempting to argue that even today English courts do
not recognize all decisions, Judge Kozinski argues that English Court of Appeal only
publishes approximately thirty-nine percent of its opinions. Id. at 1169 n. 23. This
percentage is far more than the figure reported for United States court publication to the
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property on June 27, 2002
which was twenty percent. See H.R. Jud. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual
Property (June 27, 2002.
84. Id. at 1175.
85. Id. at 1176 (describing how a "rule of decision" must not be announced, but
selected after considering the instant facts and countless permutations and be stated with
precision).
86. Id. at 1178. Though this statement is meant to explain why unpublished decisions
should not be binding, it supports the view that courts should be made to fully review and
decide each case. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904 (stating that if there is insufficient time to
fully review each case, the remedy "is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume,"
not to create an "underground body of law").
87. See Howard J. Bashman, 2002 Brings New Developments in Controversy Over the
Precedential Status of Unpublished Appellate Opinions <http://www.bipc.comlarticles-sz/unpublishedopinions.htm> (visited December 5, 2002) (noting that Justices Scalia,
Stevens and Thomas, in deciding Rogers v. Tenn., 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), supported Judge Arnold's "understanding of the role of stare decisis at the
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judges from other circuits have supported Judge Arnold's
opinion in dissent or concurring opinions. 8 The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey cited Anastasoff
and recognized the importance of precedent, but then ignored a
prior unreported decision by relying on the Supreme Court
decision in Payne v. Tennessee 9 for the proposition that stare
decisis is a "principle of policy, and not an inexorable
command." 90
The Third Circuit, which has a somewhat unique rule that
does not prohibit citation of unpublished decisions by litigants
but prohibits the court from citing such decisions as precedent, 9'
recently resolved to make its unpublished opinions available on

its own website
State courts have gone both ways in assessing whether to
give precedental value to unpublished decisions. 93 California

completely bans citation of unpublished decisions, except in
very limited circumstances. 94 Arizona has adopted depublication
rules echoing the narrow exceptions of California's rules.95
Texas has drawn a distinction between civil cases and criminal
cases. The Texas Supreme Court ordered that unpublished civil
cases may be cited, but do not have precedental weight. The
time of the Constitution's framing"). The five justices in the majority also agreed with
Justice Scalia's dissent on this point.
88. Id. "Other highly-regarded federal appellate judges have stated views similar to
those found in Judge Arnold's decision in Anastasoff." Then-Chief Judge William J.
Holloway, Jr. of the Tenth Circuit, in a dissent joined by Judges James E. Barrett and
Bobby R. Baldock, questioned the practice of denying precedential status to unpublished
appellate opinions, in In re Tenth Circuit Rules, 955 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway,
C.J., dissenting), as has retired D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia M. Wald, National
Classification Comm. v. U.S., 765 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., writing separately)
(remarking on "the unfortunate by-products of the overuse of this rapidly growing mode of
disposition" )."

89. 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
90. In re Mays, 256 B.R. 555 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (citing Anastasoff; Mays was
decided before Hart).
91. See Internal Operating Proc. of the Third Cir. 5.7 (July 1, 2002) (available at
<http://www.ca3/uscourts.gov> (visited December 5, 2002).
92. See Bashman, supra n. 87.
93. See Dwyer v. J.l Kislak Mtg. Corp., 13 P.3d 240 (Wash. App., 1st Div. 2000)
(imposing a fine against counsel for citing unpublished opinion).
94. See Cal. R. of Ct. 977 (West 2002).
95. See Az. Sup. Ct. R. 111 (West 2002); see also Michael A. Berch, Analysis of
Arizona's DepublicationRule and Practice,32 Ariz. St. L.J. 175, 186 (2000) (providing an

in-depth analysis of the application and effects of Arizona's depublication rules).
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that unpublished
criminal cases may not be cited at all.96 Texas' newly revised
Rule 47 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure will permit
citation to depublished cases accordingly.
IV.OTHER EFFORTS AGAINST VACATUR AND DEPUBLICATION

A. The American BarAssociation
The ABA resolved, as of August 2001, to "[o]ppose
prohibitions against citing or relying on unpublished opinions by
federal appellate courts and urge such courts to make their
unpublished decisions widely available and to permit citation to
relevant unpublished opinions." 97
B. Activists
Two of the most ardent activists, if not the most, working
against the use of vacatur and depublication are Michael and
Kenneth Schmier. They have received media attention for their
efforts and have taken
on the Ninth Circuit's depublication
98
practice in a lawsuit.
In November 2000, Michael Schmier filed a lawsuit in the
Northern District of California against the Ninth Circuit alleging
that the Circuit's Local Rule 36-3, prohibiting citation of
unpublished cases, violated his constitutional rights. The district
court dismissed the action for lack of standing. 99 The district
court based its dismissal on the fact that Michael Schmier had
never been penalized for citing to an unpublished decision. The
circuit court decision affirmed that reasoning. "Simply put,
Schmier has failed to allege any action by the Ninth Circuit that
96. Mary Alice Robbins, Texas CourtsSplit on "Do Not Publish" Designation, 18 Tex.

Law. I (August 13, 2002).
97. See American Bar Association Legislative Issues <http://www.abanet.org/poladv/

legiss.pdf> (current through October 2002).
98. See Gary Young, Rule Crusader,Natl. L.J. Al (June 24-July 1, 2002).
99. Schmier v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2002).

Michael was represented by his brother Kenneth in this case and the judges of the Ninth
Circuit all recused themselves, leaving the case to be decided by a three-judge panel with
each judge sitting by designation.
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has immediately and personally subjected him to sanctions or
has adversely affected one or more of Schmier's clients in a
Ninth Circuit litigation.'0°
Kenneth Schmier recently testified before the United States
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet
and Intellectual Property during an oversight hearing on
"Unpublished Judicial Opinions."' 1O Mr. Schmier appeared at
that hearing as chairman of the Committee for the Rule of Law.
The Committee's website at www.nonpublication.com is an
excellent resource, with quotes concerning the Ninth Circuit and
California State court practices of forbidding litigants to rely on
unpublished cases.
C. CongressionalHearings
On June 27, 2002, the House Committee on the Judiciary
held an oversight hearing. 0 2 At the hearing, Judge Kozinski of
the Ninth Circuit was a witness and was joined by others, one of
whom appeared to favor depublication abilities for the federal
judiciary, and two of whom supported either an end to
depublication or broad permission to cite and rely upon
unpublished decisions.' 3 The Department of Justice also has
submitted a Submission of the United States Department of

100. Id. at 822.
101. See Schmier Statement, supra n. 76.
102. The website for the United States House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee for Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property states:
F. Nonpublication of federal opinions During an oversight hearing in the 106th
Congress regarding the size and operations of the 9th Circuit, the Subcommittee
learned that some opinions in that Circuit are not published. The Circuit's
defense is that it is attempting to implement creative administrative practices that
will generate resource savings, and involves only "easy-to-decide" cases for
which there is clear and ample precedential authority. Still, the notion of not
providing an explanation as to why an affected litigant actually lost a Federal
case may not square with fundamental notions of due process. This issue needs
to be considered in all judicial circuits.
See U.S. H. of Rep., Comm. On the Jud., 107th Cong. Comm. Oversight Plan
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/oversight.htm> (visited November 12, 2002).
103. The other witnesses were Professor Arthur Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh
Law School; Kenneth Schmier, Chairman of the Committee for the Rule of Law; and the
Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Judge Arnold, the author of the Eighth Circuit's Anastasoff decision, was not present.
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Justice to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals.'°4
V. TECHNOLOGY THAT CHANGES THE REPORTING SYSTEM

A. PrivateArchival Sources

Anderson Kill's Vacatur Center' 5 was once a
groundbreaking concept providing litigants with resources
unavailable elsewhere, save the archives of institutional litigants
such as insurance companies. However, today there are more
options. Websites like www.nonpublication.com provide insight
into the process of depublication and the rules of various states
and circuits.
B. Electronic Reporting Services

Perhaps one of the most important factors in improving the
free flow of opinions, whether published or unpublished, is
electronic reporting. Not only do decisions reach the public at
impressively short rates of time, they are made available at low
cost. Thus, judicial opinions are readily accessible.'06

104. That submission reads in part:
The Department is concerned that the courts of appeals do not have uniform
rules on the citation and/or precedential value of unpublished opinions. The lack
of such rules adds to confusion about the state of the law. We urge the
development of such rules.
Department attorneys also noted a general concern about the availability of
unpublished opinions. The availability of unpublished opinions, on computer
databases or otherwise, varies from case to case and from circuit to circuit. The
lack of uniform availability of decisions poses serious problems for litigants in
all circuits by creating confusion about what the law is and where it can be
found. Several circuits do post their opinions on the Internet or a comparably
accessible database. We recommend that all circuits do so. Moreover, we
support development of a publicly available database, with an appropriate
media-neutral citation system, for long-term access to all federal judicial
decisions.
105. The Vacatur Center can be accessed at <http://www.andersonkill.com/VacaturCenter/VacaturCenter.asp> (last updated Dec. 23, 2002).
106. The facts in this section concerning reporting practices were verified by a helpful
Westlaw representative.
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Those judicial opinions that are deemed "unpublished" by
the courts do not appear in the official Federal Reporter, or only
appear as part of a table recording the fact that they were
decided. Many of those unpublished decisions appear in full
reported form on Westlaw and Lexis, however, the availability
of those decisions to Westlaw and Lexis varies by Circuit.' °7
Over the course of the past year, West has launched its
West's Federal Appendix designed to report all available circuit
court decisions in a new citation format just as if they were
published decisions.' 8 Such comprehensive reporting has
permitted litigants to cite to decisions that a court has concluded
are not important or do not involve novel questions of law. Even
in circuits where unpublished decisions are not permitted to be
reported, litigants have the opportunity to at least review all of
the court's decisions and cite to them if necessary.109
VI. CONCLUSION

The trend making depublished decisions generally available
is a success story of committed people working with new
technology. Until vacated and depublished decisions can be
commonly cited, however, the distortion of the judicial system
will continue. While the federal court system and certain states
have moved in the right direction, other states continue to assist
repeat litigants in twisting the shape of precedent.

107. See Barnett, supra n. 80, at 2 (describing how the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do
not provide West with any information beyond the decision itself as reported in a table).
108. Id. (describing the West press release for the Federal Appendix and reporting on an

interview with a West representative). The First and Eighth Circuits already have
established rules clarifying that the court's designation as "unpublished" is not altered by
West's publication of a decision so designated. Id. In January 2002, the D.C. Circuit
amended its citation rules to permit citation to unpublished decisions and permit litigants to
argue, against a contrary presumption, that an unpublished decision is binding precedent on
a particular issue. Id.; see also Bashman, supra n. 87.
109. See e.g. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving citation by
counsel of a decision depublished by the Ninth Circuit).

